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REPORT ON THE INTERNAL SECURITY
FORCES IN ZIMBABWE
Geoffrey Feltoe*
I. INTRODUCTION
On 25th July 1990 the state of emergency that had been in
operation throughout Zimbabwe for almost twenty-five years came to
an end. Before the attainment of democratic rule the white minority
regime had used the state of emergency to evoke a whole range of
extreme powers to try to suppress the struggle for majority rule.
Under emergency regulations, the regime was permitted to detain
persons without trial. There were two types of detention: indefinite
detention and thirty-day detention. The latter could be renewed for
further thirty-day periods. The indefinite detention provisions were
used mostly against black leaders. Short-term detention was used to
hold persons suspected of collaboration with the liberation fighters.
Large numbers of persons were detained under both provisions.
As the armed struggle intensified during the 1970s all Internal
Security Forces (ISFs) of the regime became actively involved in the
anti-insurgency war. Full-time regular Police Force members were
increasingly used in a para-military capacity. The Special Branch of
the Police was used as an intelligence gathering agency and conscripts
were drafted into the Police Anti-Terrorist Unit. Torture was used
extensively by the Special Branch and other units of the Police. It was
also used by the Army both against captured guerrillas and civilians
suspected of collaborating with the insurgents. Special units like the
Central Intelligence Organisation and an Army unit called the Selous
Scouts were formed to engage in dirty, clandestine warfare techniques
against the insurgents. In addition to the state of emergency, the
minority regime created a network of draconian security laws; the
most notorious of which was the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act.
When the new democratic government assumed office in 1980 all
the repressive powers which the previous regime had created were left
intact. The interim British Administration decided that it was for the
incoming Government to determine what sort of security legislation
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was necessary and appropriate. It was hoped, of course, that the new
Government would move quickly to dismantle this array of oppressive
provisions that had been used so cruelly against the black majority.
This was not to be. Most of the repressive legislation remains intact
and little changed to this day. However, at the beginning of 1994 the
Supreme Court ruled the provision in the Law and Order
(Maintenance) Act, relating to the control of public demonstrations to
be unconstitutional insofar as it violated the guarantees of freedom of
expression and assembly contained in the Constitution.
The policy of reconciliation applied by the incoming Government
meant that many of the same personnel who had served in the internal
security agencies of the previous regime remained in their positions.
Many Police Officers that had known no other form of policing than
under a state of emergency, under which extreme and extraordinary
powers could be used, remained in the various ISFs. Many of the
notorious torturers of the various intelligence units of the former
regime also remained in office, some became the trainers of the new
regime or the trainers of torturers of the new regime. The result of all
this was that no clear break was made with the past. This would
probably not have proved to be too detrimental in human rights terms
if the years following independence had been peaceful, for, in that
event, the new Government probably would have moved quickly to
repeal the odious security legislation which had been used against
many of the people who now formed the government, and the state of
emergency would also probably have ended. But that was not to be.
For a number of years following Independence Zimbabwe faced
massive sabotage and destabilisation from South Africa, plus
widespread banditry activity in the Southern and Western regions of
the country. Because of these serious security problems the
Government extended the state of emergency, and the internal security
forces again became involved in a para-military role. Detention
without trial was again used. Whites believed to be involved in South
African inspired sabotage were picked up and some were tortured.
Many people who were held in detention during the military
campaigns in Matabeleland were ill treated or tortured. Civilians
disappeared and were never found again. Numerous civilians were
killed during the military campaigns. The Government did set up a
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Commission of Inquiry to investigate these human rights abuses.
Despite assurances by Mr. Mugabe (then the Prime Minister) that the
findings of this Commission would be made public, the Government
later refused to publish its findings. As a result of the Unity Accord in
1989, amnesties were granted for all actions taken by both the
Government Forces and the insurgents. This meant that human rights
abusers on both sides were granted immunity and were therefore not
brought to justice. As will be seen below, amnesties have led to
human rights abusers in the ISFs escaping justice. In some cases they
have been immediately re-instated into their units without any
disciplinary action against them.
All of these features impaired efforts to establish a new
professional Police Force after Independence. Whilst the Police
continued to have extreme powers and to employ strong-armed tactics
in security operations, it was almost impossible to train recruits, and to
retrain serving Police Officers, on the limits of police powers, the need
for professional investigation techniques and the necessity to respect
the fundamental human rights of the people.
Only when the state of emergency ended in 1990 could such
training commence. At that time, the Police Force itself asked to
receive lectures on its role in a non-emergency. An NGO, the Legal
Resources Foundation of Zimbabwe (LRF) was then asked to mount
seminars about the proper role and functions of the Police and the
requirement that the Police respect human rights. Thus began a
regular program of LRF seminars and workshops that continue today.
This program has focused particularly on unlawful arrest and detention
and what forms of interrogation are prohibited.
In the beginning, this program was also conducted for members of
the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO). When this organisation
came under fire from the human rights bodies, the CIO pulled out of
the program and stated that they had people within Government who
could do this training.
Another major feature of policing in the post-Independence period
was the continued use of the Police on a partisan basis to protect the
interests of the ruling party-especially when Zimbabwe was heading
in the direction of establishing a de jure one party state and when there
was, as still there is, a complete blurring of the distinction between the
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State and the ruling party. The members of the Police Force who had
served under the old regime, were naturally reticent about trying to
prevent illegal harassment of opponents by the ruling party's Youth
League, its Women's League and the People's Militia. Many Police
Officers left the Force after Independence. This was particularly the
case at higher levels where there was a mass exodus of whites that had
occupied all the senior ranking positions. Many of the recruits were
ex-combatants whose experience lay in fighting a guerrilla war.
Ruling party loyalists were placed in many of the top ranking
positions. In the last few years when the issue of human rights has
moved into the forefront, both internationally and domestically, and
Zimbabweans having become far more aware of their rights and far
less tolerant of abuses, the Government has felt constrained to ensure
greater observance of human rights and to move in the direction of
more professional, apolitical ISFs. For example, the CIO came in for
tremendous criticism in 1991 as a result of revelations during the
preliminary hearings of a criminal case involving the probable murder
of a woman allegedly by its agents. Following the outcry over the
nefarious activities of the CIO, the Government decided to withdraw
its powers to arrest and detain persons.
One of the reasons why the Police have placed increased emphasis
on instruction on what is required in order lawfully to arrest and detain
persons is that the Police Force was frequently sued for unlawful arrest
and detention and the responsible Ministry was having to pay out
considerable sums of money to the claimants.
A. Declaration of emergencies
There is currently no state of emergency in operation in any part of
Zimbabwe. Under Section 31J of the Constitution, the President may
at any time declare a state of emergency countrywide or on a regional
basis. This will only last for fourteen days if Parliament is sitting or
thirty days if Parliament is not sitting unless within these periods the
President's declaration is approved by Parliament. Parliament may
resolve that a state of public emergency exists countrywide or in a
particular region. This resolution only requires a simple majority of
the votes by Parliament members. The state of emergency will last for
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six months, but can be renewed for further unlimited periods of six
months.
When a state of emergency is declared, the following fundamental
rights are suspended: the right to personal liberty, protection from
arbitrary search and seizure, freedom of expression, freedom of
assembly and association, freedom of movement and protection from
discrimination. During a state of emergency the Constitution allows
for indefinite detention without trial. Certain safeguards apply when a
person is detained. The most important of these is that the case must
be referred to a tribunal within thirty days for review. If the tribunal
recommends release of the detainee on the grounds that there is
insufficient cause for detention, the detainee must be released unless
the President directs otherwise. After the first review the case will be
reviewed at intervals of 180 days.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF ISFs IN ZIMBABWE
The main internal security forces in Zimbabwe are the following:
* The Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP)
* The Police Support Unit
* The Special Constabulary
* The Support Unit and the Riot Squad
* The Police Internal Security and Intelligence unit (PISI)
• The Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO)
• The Presidential Guard (PG)
• The Intelligence Units of the Army and the Air Force
• The Youth Brigade of the ruling party
• The People's Militia
• The Women's League of the ruling party
This paper is primarily a study of the ZRP, the major internal
security force in the country.
A. The Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP)
The ZRP, which is the regular Police Force in Zimbabwe, is
established by the Constitution. Section 93 provides that the Police
Force is established to preserve internal security and to maintain law
and order. Each member of the Force is charged "with the general
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duty of maintaining law and order, of taking all steps which on
reasonable grounds appear to him to be necessary for preserving the
peace, for preventing crime, for protecting property from malicious
injury, for the detection of crime and for the apprehending of offenders
and of suppressing all forms of civil commotion or disturbance that
may occur in any part of Zimbabwe."
1. Command, structure, promotion, discipline and dismissal
The Police Force is under the overall command of the
Commissioner of Police, but the President under §93(3) of the
Constitution may give general, binding policy directives to him or her.
Additionally, under § 11 of the Police Act, the Minister of Home
Affairs is empowered to give general directions of policy to the
Commissioner, who is obliged to comply. The Minister can only give
such directives where he considers this to be necessary in the public
interest and only relating to the appointment, promotion, training and
disposition of the Force and the maintenance of the Force in a high
state of efficiency.
The Commissioner is appointed by the President after consultation
with a Board consisting of the Chairman of the Police Service
Commission, the retiring Commissioner of Police, if available, and
another member appointed, by the President from the Secretaries of
Ministries (or two Secretaries of Ministries appointed by the President
if the retiring Commissioner is not available). The Commissioner is
appointed for four years and must resign thereafter. The President
may extend his term for periods of not more than twelve months at a
time. The Commissioner may be removed from office by the
President for any reason, after consultation with the Cabinet. The
President appoints all commissioned officers. The President also may
promote, suspend, reduce in rank or discharge such officers, In
exercising these powers the President must pay heed to, but is not
bound by, the advice of the Minister of Home Affairs after the
Minister has consulted with the Commissioner.
The Commissioner appoints non-commissioned officers in
consultation with the Police Service Commission and is given the
power to reprimand, suspend, reduce in rank or discharge non-
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commissioned officers. The Commissioner may promote non-
commissioned officers on the advice of Advisory Boards established
to consider the suitability of such officers for promotion. However,
the Minister of Home Affairs is empowered to give general directions
with which the Commissioner must comply relating to the
appointment, promotion, training and disposition of members of the
Force, as well as for the maintenance of a high degree of efficiency.
Officers who have served for more than two years may not be removed
or reduced in rank except with the confirmation of the Police Service
Commission. The Police Service Commission is provided for in
Section 95 of the Constitution. It is headed by the Chairman of the
Public Service Commission and two to four other members appointed
by the President, one of whom must be a person who has held a senior
ranking position in the Police for at least five years. The Constitution
provides in Section 96 that this Commission may make regulations for
the general well-being and good administration of the Force and the
maintenance of the Force in a high state of efficiency and the
conditions of members of the Force, which may include provision for
the punishment of members found guilty of offences against discipline.
It may also deal with complaints by members of the Force. In Section
55 of the Police Act it is provided that the Commission may make
recommendations to the Minister regarding salaries and general
conditions of service of Force members after consultation with the
Police Commissioner.
The Commissioner, in consultation with the Minister of Home
Affairs, may make Standing Orders regarding the discipline, regulation
and orderly conduct of the affairs of the Police Force. Although the
Police Force represents the authority of the State and is an arm of the
State whose duty is to maintain law and order, the authority of the
Police derives from the law, and it is governed by the law. Members
of the Police Force should be duty bound to uphold and enforce the
law. The Police Force should not be used as a political instrument of
the State; it should never be used as an instrument of terror or
intimidation by the ruling party against members of opposition parties
who are lawfully exercising their political rights. The Police Force
should thus be apolitical and should not be subjected to political
interference by the ruling party.
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In theory, the Police Force is a professional, apolitical force.
Under the Police Act, it is an offence for any member of the Force to
engage actively in politics, and this is defined to include: joining or
associating with a political organisation or movement, canvassing in
support of a political organisation, attending political meetings in
uniform and publishing views of a political nature. In practice, some
members of the Police Force have exercised their powers in a partisan
fashion so as to support the ruling party and to discriminate against
members of opposition parties. Thus the Police have, in the past,
prevented or closed down meetings and rallies of opposition parties.
In some instances, the Police have acted on the instructions of senior
politicians. They have, on occasion, complied with instructions from
politicians to arrest and detain people who have not committed any
criminal offences but have merely been critical of the ruling party.
There have also been instances where politicians have stopped or tried
to stop Police investigations into criminal wrongdoing by the
politicians themselves or their friends or relatives. On the other hand
there have been a number of reported cases in which Police Officers
have refused to comply with instructions from politicians because
those officers believed that what they were being instructed to do was
not lawful.
2. Arrest, interrogation and detention
The power of Police Officers to search, arrest and detain suspects
derives from an Act of Parliament passed by the legislature, namely
the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 59]. These powers
are only exercisable in limited and specifically defined circumstances.
Broadly speaking they follow common law principles.
The Police may obviously question suspects both before and after
they have been arrested. There has been a pronounced tendency for
the Police to arrest first (often based on very flimsy evidence) and then
to investigate after arrest. This practice has been severely criticised by
the courts in a number of reported cases. There is a heavy reliance
upon extracting confessions, rather than carrying out proper
investigations. Frequently, there has been resort to unlawful methods
of extracting confessions, including physical ill treatment. Efforts
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have been made, however, to try to prevent such practices. Police
officers have from time to time been prosecuted in the courts for
culpable homicide and assault arising out of maltreatment of prisoners.
The person detained is entitled to consult with his lawyer before
making any statement. He is also entitled to have his lawyer present
when he makes his statement. It was ruled in a recent Supreme Court
case that the failure to accord the prisoner these rights would render
the statement inadmissible as evidence. Most prisoners, however,
cannot afford to bring in lawyers and the State legal aid system does
not allow for lawyers to be assigned at the pre-trial stage. This applies
no matter how serious the charges are.
The Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act provides for a
mechanism to ensure that confessions are not unlawfully extracted by
the Police: the procedure under which statements made by persons in
custody are taken before magistrates for confirmation. There is an
incentive to have statements judicially confirmed because once a
statement is confirmed, the onus will then be on the accused at his trial
to prove that the statement was not freely and voluntarily made. Of
course, his failure to object at the confirmation proceedings will be
held against him. On the other hand, if the statement was not
confirmed the State will have to prove that it was made freely and
voluntarily. At the confirmation proceedings the magistrate is
supposed to probe carefully whether the statement was made freely
and voluntarily. If the magistrate finds that it was not he will refuse to
confirm the statement. However, in practice this investigation is often
done very cursorily.
The Police are entitled to hold arrested persons at Police Stations.
It has been held by the courts, however, that they are not permitted to
move prisoners from Police Station to Police Station simply to
frustrate efforts by their lawyers to gain access to their clients. They
are also not entitled deliberately to move prisoners to far distant places
to make it more difficult for the prisoners to have access to their
lawyers. However, the Police often try to keep prisoners from having
contact with their lawyers until they have extracted confessions. They
may try to hinder access by denying that they are holding the prisoner
at that particular Police Station or by moving the prisoner from one
Police Station to another. Once prisoners have been taken before the
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court and have been remanded in custody, they are supposed to be
incarcerated in the remand prisons operated by the Prison Department.
However, the Police may take such prisoners back to Police Stations if
this is necessary for further investigations, such as the holding of
identity parades.
The Police are obliged to inform the arrested person of the reasons
for his arrest and to caution him. They are supposed to comply with
any request by the arrested person to contact his lawyer or to inform
relatives or friends of his arrest. In practice the Police often hold
persons incommunicado until they have obtained a confession from
them.
3. Training
Recruits go through an intensive training program at the Police
Depot. In this course they are taught the rudiments of policing. They
are trained in firearms, Police powers and duties, criminal law,
evidence and procedure. A constable may sit for promotional exams
from constable to sergeant only after he has served two years in the
Force. There are further examinations for promotion from sergeant to
inspector and from inspector to higher ranks. Officers attend courses
at the Police Staff College before sitting for these examinations. The
training has increasingly emphasised that Police Officers must respect
the fundamental rights of all citizens as enshrined in the Bill of Rights
to the Constitution of Zimbabwe. One reason for the intensification of
training on fundamental rights is the increase in legal actions against
the Police for unlawful arrest, detention and assault.
4. Control and oversight
In Zimbabwe there is no independent body that may receive and
investigate complaints by members of the public that their rights have
been abused by members of the Police Force. The Ombudsman does
not have jurisdiction to deal with these complaints. Zimbabwe does
not have a Human Rights Commission. Serious public allegations of
human rights abuses might be taken up in Parliament by concerned
Parliamentarians.
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The control of the Police Force lies primarily with the
Commissioner of Police, but the Minister of Home Affairs is expected
to ensure that the Police do not abuse their powers. He, in theory, is
answerable in Parliament if serious abuses do occur and if questions
are raised in Parliament. As stated above, the President may give the
Commissioner general directions as to policy and the Minister of
Home Affairs may give general directions, with which the
Commissioner must comply. These directions may relate to such
matters as the training and the disposition of members of the Force.
Additionally, the Police Service Commission may investigate
complaints by members of the Force (but not members of the public)
by carrying out an inquiry or investigation into the practices of the
Police Force. The Commission may submit a special report to the
Minister of Home Affairs on any matters that the Commission sees fit
to report and may require him to present this report before Parliament.
The control of finances is a matter for the officers in charge of the
various sections. Where irregularities are discovered or suspected, the
officer in charge can request an internal audit by the Auditor-General.
Offences against the Police Act aimed at financial control include:
solicitation or acceptance of bribes, wilfully or negligently losing,
destroying or damaging State property or property in the possession of
the State or exhibits in criminal cases, and improperly appropriating
such property, knowingly making false entries and returns and
suppressing evidence. Cases of deliberate theft or corruption by Police
Officers are to be placed before the ordinary criminal courts and not
dealt with as internal disciplinary matters. There have been a number
of criminal prosecutions of Police Officers for offences such as bribery
and theft in the past. There is no code of conduct dealing with
corruption. This malpractice is however punishable under the ordinary
law and under the Police Act.
5. Codes of conduct
There are no codes of conduct for members of the ZRP except for
the Standing Orders and certain provisions in the Police Act that lay
down what types of conduct constitute punishable offences. These
relate, mostly, to the efficient performance of their duties and their
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relationship with other members of the Force. However, there are
offences under this Act that relate to how members of the ZRP deal
with members of the public-for instance it is an offence for a Police
Officer to detain any person in custody unnecessarily, to use
unnecessary violence or ill treat any person in custody, to neglect a
person in custody or to use unnecessary violence towards any person
he may come into contact with in the execution of his duties. There is
little knowledge in Zimbabwe about the United Nations Code of
Conduct for Law Enforcement Agencies and other relevant
international instruments, and this Code is not used by any of the ISFs.
However, the Legal Resources Foundation makes reference to this
Code, and other relevant codes, such as the Minimum Standards for
Prisoners, in its training program for Law Enforcement Agencies.
6. Accountability
There are no provisions in the Constitution or the Police Act,
which specifically require commanding officers, and other members of
the Police Force, to prevent violations of human rights and punish
offenders. Such abuses would, however, constitute disciplinary
offences as well as criminal and civil wrongs. The failure to prevent
or to investigate such wrongs would constitute neglect of duty under
the Police Act. Under the general law, failure of the person charged
with preventing a prisoner being assaulted or killed would cause the
Police Officer in charge to be liable under both criminal and civil law.
The State would be vicariously liable for the civil wrong in any case
where a death has occurred that is not due to natural causes. The
Inquests Act requires that an inquest be held to determine what
happened and if anyone was criminally responsible for causing the
death. Thus, where a prisoner dies in Police custody and there is
anything to suggest that the death was not caused naturally, the case
should be taken before a magistrate under this Act. In practice,
however, some deaths have not been fully and satisfactorily
investigated. This has led to suspicions by the public that the causes of
these deaths have been covered up. On the other hand, there are cases
where Police Officers have been prosecuted for assault of prisoners
and even homicide.
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As noted, the Police Act sets out offences that might be committed
by members of the Police Force, including offences that involve
human rights abuse, such as unnecessarily detaining a person or using
unnecessary violence. When a Police Officer commits any of these
offences, the Police Act provides that the case can be referred either to
the ordinary courts or to an internal Police disciplinary body. The
person being charged can request that the case be dealt with in the
ordinary courts. If the matter is dealt with internally, and the
punishment imposed is considered to be inadequate, there is a
procedure under which the matter can be referred to the Attorney-
General who in turn may refer the case to the High Court which may,
where appropriate, set aside the original penalty and impose a harsher
sentence.
The practice which has apparently been adopted in the past is that
where an officer has committed an offence against a member of the
public or his property or involving corruption or misappropriation of
State property, such cases will be referred to the ordinary court unless
the offence was so minor that it could adequately be dealt with under
the internal disciplinary processes.
The ordinary courts have the jurisdiction to deal with all criminal
cases arising out of human rights abuses such as homicide, rape,
kidnapping, indecent assault, assault and criminal injuria. They can
entertain civil cases for loss of support due to the death, assault,
unlawful arrest and unlawful imprisonment. There have been criminal
and civil cases against Police Officers for all of these wrongs.
However, the court that is most accessible to ordinary people, the
Small Claims Court where claimants need not employ counsel, has no
jurisdiction to try cases involving unlawful arrest and imprisonment.
The Attorney-General has power to prosecute Police Officers for
any criminal offences and to direct the Commissioner of Police to
investigate particular offences. This power was exercised a few years
ago when allegations of corruption by the Commissioner of Police
were brought to the attention of the Attorney-General. In this case, the
Attorney-General's staff, carried out the investigations because it was
realised that subordinate officers in the Police would be unable to
pursue such an investigation against the head of the Force.
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7. Civil liability
Victims of human rights abuse by Police personnel have the legal
right to seek redress and compensation in the civil courts. However,
there is widespread ignorance about the legal remedies of those who
have been subject to abuses. Free legal aid is provided in relatively
few cases and only to very poor persons. Lawyers' fees, in general, are
expensive. This means that relatively few claims are brought against
the Police and most claims are brought by more affluent members of
society. In cases of unlawful imprisonment, which have come before
the courts, sizeable amounts of damages have been awarded. In the
first few years after Independence a number of whites, suspected of
acting as agents for South Africa, were detained by the Police and held
without trial. Some were tortured. A number of those detained, sued
for damages after their release. In some of these cases the State
refused to pay the damages awarded. Mr. Mugabe, then the Prime
Minister, stated publicly that these person would not be paid
essentially because this would be a waste of taxpayers' money, as these
men had been South African agents and had only been acquitted by the
courts on technicalities.
8. Transparency and access to records
The Police are obliged to keep official records of all arrests,
searches and interrogations. They must also inform all persons they
arrest of the reasons why they are being arrested. The public does not
have access to arrest records. The legal representatives of prisoners
have a right to know where their clients are being held and the reasons
for their incarceration. They may also request access to relevant
documentation and the courts can order the production of such records.
In Zimbabwe there is no freedom of information legislation that
requires public officials to provide relevant information and
documentation on request.
Theoretically there are no legal restrictions on the press and NGOs
in regards to monitoring the ISFs and investigating and publicising
cases of human rights abuse. In practice, however, there are
considerable barriers. As stated above, there is no legal obligation by
the Police Force to supply information to any organisations.
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Therefore, it is very difficult to establish the veracity of the allegations
of wrongdoing. Those conducting investigations must be careful lest
they contravene vaguely defined provisions in security legislation -
such as a provision in the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act that
makes it an offence to bring the Police into disrepute. However, in
recent years the independent press and NGOs have been prepared to
expose publicly police abuses where they believe the allegations to
have substance. Human rights organisations have been permitted to
bring actions on behalf of persons whose human rights are allegedly
being infringed where it would not be possible for the persons affected
to bring the actions themselves. Thus, they have been allowed to bring
habeas corpus actions on behalf of persons alleged to be illegally
detained or tortured. Where the courts discern a systematic pattern of
human rights abuse they can order the appropriate authorities to take
action to investigate and put a stop to such abuse, but the only persons
and bodies entitled to order reforms of ISFs, to safeguard human
rights, would be the Executive, particularly the Minister of Home
Affairs, the Commissioner of Police and the Police Service
Commission.
9. Superior orders
The law holds that the defence of superior orders does not avail
where the order was so manifestly illegal that any reasonable person
would realise that the order should not be obeyed. Thus, a person who
obeys an order to shoot innocent civilians or to torture a person would
not be able to escape liability on the basis of obedience to superior
orders. This is laid down in a series of cases such as S v Hamadriripi,
High Court Case No 113 of 1989. This law relating to superior orders
applies to the operations of all ISFs within Zimbabwe.
B. The Special Constabulary
This unit is an auxiliary force to the regular Police. Large numbers
of persons have been recruited into it, without receiving the same level
of instruction as members of the regular Police Force. The result was
that poorly trained members of the Special Constabulary frequently
misunderstood or abused their powers. Under the new Police Act, the
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Minister of Home Affairs has been given the power to disband this
unit if the circumstances require it.
Members of the Special Constabulary are governed by the Police
Act and the ordinary law of the land in the same way as regular Police
Officers are.
C. The Police Support Unit and the Riot Squad
These units are responsible for, among other things, riot
control. Unfortunately, in the performance of their duties, it is quite
clear that they have not been properly trained in the use of minimum
force methods. On a number of occasions when the riot squad has
come onto the University campus, they have engaged in indiscriminate
brutality. They assaulted whichever students got in the way and tear-
gassed halls of residences. This violence was not used to counteract
student violence, but instead used to punish the students.
D. The Police Internal Security and Intelligence unit (PISI)
With respect to this unit and all the agencies dealt with below, the
ordinary law of the land applies to theft activities. Members of these
units can be prosecuted for the commission of crimes. They can also
be sued under civil law and the State can be held civilly liable for theft
actions based on the doctrine of vicarious liability. There are no
special immunities with respect to actions taken against members of
these units. In practice, however, it is very difficult to successfully
bring legal actions against members of these units. The personnel
operate in plain clothes and, at times, in a very clandestine manner.
Therefore, identification of the specific unit from which the culprits
came can be very difficult. PISI has its roots in the old Ground Cover
division of the white minority regime. It is an internal security unit set
up within the Police. It is not established under any legislative
provisions and there are no regulations governing how it operates. The
scope of its mandate is also unclear. During the Matabeland
disturbances in the 1980s, PISI apparently assumed a major role in the
Government's campaign against ZAPU and dissidents. Africa Watch
reports that it carried out most of the arrests of ZAPU officials and its
INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES IN ZIMBABWE
supporters. Its treatment of detainees earned PISI a reputation for
brutality matching that of the CIO, if not worse
E. The Central Intelligence Organization (CIO)
The CIO is not established or governed by any legislative
provisions. This unit falls under the Ministry of State Security, which
is responsible for regulating the activities. The role of the CIO is
supposed to be to gather intelligence information as it relates to
activities that may threaten the security of Zimbabwe. It is a carry-
over from the white regime, under which it acquired a reputation for
secrecy and brutality. Some of the personnel who were in this unit
before Independence have remained after Independence. Its plain-
clothed agents were in the forefront of the human rights abuses that
occurred in the first decade after Independence. Whites accused of
sabotage, ZAPU members and civilians detained during the
Matabeland troubles, were often subjected to torture by members of
the CIO. There were abductions and disappearances. In one case, a
prisoner was shot in cold blood by a member of the CIO at a notorious
detention camp in Matabeland. This officer was later tried for murder.
He was convicted and sentenced to death but was immediately
released under the amnesty which was declared when the political
accord was struck between ZAPU (PF) and ZAPU. He was then
immediately taken back into the CIO.
The ruling party has made extensive use of the CIO to keep under
surveillance and to harass members of opposition parties and other
vocal critics. These sorts of activities have been most intensive in the
lead-up to general elections. Just before the 1985 elections, a senior
CIO operative and a leader in the youth section of the ruling party
attacked and attempted to kill a leader of one of the opposition parties.
Some years later these two persons were put on trial for attempted
murder. They were found guilty in the magistrate's court and
sentenced to seven years imprisonment. In his judgement, the
magistrate severely criticised the Police for failing to investigate the
matter properly; he suggested that there might have been other people
higher up who were behind this incident. He, also, roundly
condemned the attitude on the part of some members of the ISFs that
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opposition figures were enemies of the state against whom extreme
action could be taken. He observed that this frame of mind is
completely contrary to the tenets of a competitive democracy
enshrined in the Constitution of Zimbabwe. The Supreme Court later
rejected the appeal of these two men. However, only a few days later,
the President granted them remissions of sentences.
From about 1991 onwards there has been increasing public
criticism of the way in which the CIO operates. This started with a
case in which members of the CIO were alleged to have kidnapped and
killed a woman. After some time had elapsed, the CIO operatives who
were believed to have been involved were prosecuted. Chief Inspector
Chirume, who gave evidence in a preliminary hearing, asserted that the
CIO was "the most fearful organisation in this country." He went on
to say that it had taken more than a year to start investigations into the
case because many of the Police Officers had been reluctant because
of fears that they would be killed. Fear of the CIO had even led some
officers to offer to resign rather than become involved in the
investigation. Eventually the charges against the Police Officers were
withdrawn, as the Attorney-General's office maintained that there was
insufficient evidence to justify a prosecution. (One of the prominent
accused had threatened to blow the whistle on higher ups if he was
convicted.) After this case human rights organisations found the
courage to voice condemnation of the CIO and make suggestions for
holding this unit more accountable and less subject to political
manipulation. This appears to have led to a realisation that blatant
abuses will be exposed, and two years ago the President decided to
remove the CIO's power to arrest and detain.
F. The Presidential Guard (PG)
The PG is a special battalion tasked with safeguarding the security
of the State President and with carrying out various military functions
on ceremonial occasions. From time to time members of this unit
have, apparently, performed surveillance functions in relation to
political opponents of the ruling party. There are reported instances
where members of this unit have picked up people and handed them
over to the Police or to the CIO.
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G. The Intelligence Units of the Army and the Air Force
These units perform a variety of intelligence and security
functions, mostly in relation to members of the Armed Forces, but
from time to time they have engaged in intelligence gathering on
persons in Zimbabwe who are not members of the Armed Forces.
H. The Youth Brigade and The Women's League
These wings of the ruling party can be said to perform an internal
security role in a loose sense in that they keep members of opposition
parties under surveillance and have in the past engaged in reprisals
against them. The President has instructed members of the Brigade to
engage in door-to-door campaigning in support of the ruling party in
the lead-up to the coming general election. Opposition party members
felt that this door-to-door campaigning would result in hostile steps
being taken against them. Similar harassment by the Women's League
has been reported.
L The People's Militia
This unit operated during the periods when there was internal
violence in the country. It was essentially the military wing of the
Youth Brigade. Its members carried firearms, mostly automatic
weapons. During the Matabeland troubles they committed human
rights abuses against civilians. In other areas they were used to harass
and intimidate members of opposition parties.
III. CONCLUSION
A. Institutional devices for the control of ISFs and for remedying
abuses by ISF personnel
Few formal mechanisms exist for controlling the ISFs and those
that do exist are weak and ineffectual. As indicated above, there is no
Human Rights Commission or any other independent body established
to deal with the complaints of abuse by ISF personnel. The
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Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to investigate and remedy such
abuses; such powers are explicitly excluded from his/her terms of
reference. The author has, however, been reliably informed that the
Government plans in the near future to extend the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman office and to allow this office to look into alleged abuses
by members of the army, the Police and the Prison Service.
Two mechanisms currently exist for the control of ISF behaviour.
The first is the Commissioner of Police. Complaints of Police abuse
can be made to this office. The second is the court system. At present,
civil actions can be brought in ordinary courts for harm caused by the
illegal actions of ISFs.
There is no system of community involvement in the regulation of
the Police, nor are civilians represented on bodies such as the Police
Service Commission. However, the Police have set up a countrywide
Police liaison system. Community Liaison Officers have the
responsibility for assisting civilians in matters such as informal dispute
resolution and mediation.
There is no Code of Conduct for ISFs, but the Police Act provides
a Schedule of Offences that will lead to disciplinary actions being
taken against Police Officers for infractions. The standing orders of
the Police and Police training manuals also set out limits on Police
powers. The Legal Resources Foundation has also produced a Law
Enforcement Agency Manual, in which the constitutional provisions
affecting policing and limiting their powers are discussed.
The work carried out on Police training has gone a long way
towards inculcating the values necessary for the operation of an
apolitical, professional force that understands its proper role in a
democratic society. This role includes respecting human rights and
exercising one's power responsibly and with restraint, but there
continue to be reports of Police misconduct. Assaults on suspects still
happen quite often. Rape still occurs occasionally. During the
disturbances that occurred at the University in July 1995, the riot
squad perpetrated many human rights abuses. They brutally beat
students, staff and visitors to the university; dogs were set upon
individuals as well. In most instances, the persons attacked were not
engaged in any unlawful, riotous action.
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Training programs with a strong human rights content need to be
conducted on a regular basis. Additionally, senior officers in charge of
Police operations need to take strong measures to ensure that human
rights are not abused during the course of Police operations. Stringent
disciplinary measures need to be taken against those officers who
actually order or encourage their subordinates to behave in a fashion
that is abusive of human rights.
There is an urgent need to establish independent institutional
structures for effectively dealing with complaints of abuse by member
of ISFs. These should be readily accessible to aggrieved members of
the public. They should also operate without financial charge to the
complainants. (Court actions are currently beyond the reach of most
people, except where NGOs assist the complainants in bringing the
action.) The complaint bodies must be truly independent and must be
properly funded and staffed to carry out their duties.
Finally, NGOs must continue to conduct effective public human
rights education programs to make the public aware that members of
ISFs who abuse their rights are operating outside the bounds of what is
acceptable. These programs should encourage persons not to tolerate
such abuses, but to report them and pursue other remedies to seek
redress for the violations.
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